Research security, science diplomacy, and geopolitical fracture
Once on a converging path, research systems around the world are now facing growing restriction and government intervention
A few years ago, research security looked like a convergence story, with shared frameworks and increasingly aligned expectations. Through the G7, OECD, Five Eyes and other forums, countries have worked towards shared principles for protecting sensitive research while preserving the benefits of international collaboration.
At the flagship European research security conference of 2025, much of the discussion centred on whether harmonisation or alignment was the more realistic goal. Today, however, some of the largest research nations are pulling in different directions even as many middle powers continue building towards common ground.
That pursuit of alignment was never simply about agreeing a common set of principles. It was also about reducing friction within an increasingly complex and global research system. Shared concepts, common expectations and broadly compatible approaches made it easier for researchers, institutions and funders to collaborate across borders while managing legitimate risks.
When I spoke with Brendan Walker-Munro, associate professor at Southern Cross University, he noted that this pattern is not unique to research security. Similar dynamics have emerged in export control regimes, where initial convergence around shared frameworks gradually gave way to more national and mini-lateral approaches as strategic priorities diverged.
A recent Harvard study considered the impact of geopolitics on collaboration. Looking at research papers and patents between 2000 and 2023, the authors found that worsening geopolitical alignment was associated with reduced international collaboration – but also that global research networks remain more resilient than current political rhetoric might suggest.
The volume of research security policies, frameworks and initiatives continues to accelerate across the global ecosystem. The pressing question has thus become: how can universities and other research organisations navigate a world in which research systems are no longer moving in the same direction?
Alignment under pressure
Research security frameworks in countries such as the UK, Australia, Canada and the United States were initially developed as domestic responses to concerns about intellectual property, research integrity, foreign interference and emerging technologies.
Over time, however, attention turned towards alignment between systems as states realised that shifting risk was not the same as reducing it. The UK’s Trusted Research and Innovation agenda and the US National Science Foundation’s TRUST framework shared many common features, including transparency, disclosure, due diligence and institutional responsibility.
The underlying assumption was that collaboration should continue, but with better governance. In a similar vein, the European Council recommendation on enhancing research security emphasised openness, academic freedom and international cooperation alongside stronger safeguards.
For a time, the broad direction of travel appeared similar: manage risk without undermining collaboration.
Since then, the US National Science Foundation has announced new restrictions on collaboration with entities appearing on US restricted-party lists, signalling a move away from managing risk within collaboration towards defining categories of permitted and prohibited relationships.
At exactly the same time, wider developments in the US research system have raised questions about scientific talent, funding stability and international competitiveness. Proposed science funding cuts and growing uncertainty around the research environment have prompted concerns about the long-term attractiveness of the United States as a destination for researchers.
Scientific advantage is not protected only through restrictions. It is also protected through funding, institutional strength and the ability to attract and retain talent. Policies designed to protect knowledge can produce unintended consequences if they fail to consider the people who produce that knowledge in the first place.
One striking example emerged only days after the NSF announcement. Reporting on the policy noted that one notable omission from the restricted lists was Tsinghua University. Around the same time, Tsinghua announced that it had recruited Nobel Prize-winning chemist Omar Yaghi from the University of California, Berkeley, to help establish a new institute focused on AI-enabled materials discovery.
It would be a mistake, however, to frame this as a story of American restriction versus global openness. China is also becoming more interventionist.
Alongside substantial investment in research and active recruitment of international talent, China has introduced tighter controls around technology transfer, data, overseas investment and strategically important sectors. Recent reporting on the detention of a US seismologist who had studied North Korean nuclear tests is another reminder that China is willing to intervene where research and national security intersect.
This points to a broader pattern visible across major scientific powers: greater state involvement in determining how knowledge, technology and talent move across borders. This creates a challenge for countries that depend heavily on international collaboration but lack the scale of either the US or China.
The middle-power response
Across Europe, significant efforts are still underway to deepen cooperation around research security. The proposed European Research Area Act is intended to strengthen coordination between member states, reduce fragmentation and create more consistent approaches to research and innovation. The European Commission has also announced plans for a European Centre of Expertise on Research Security, along with shared due diligence tools and common resilience-testing methodologies.
The objective remains familiar: reduce friction, improve consistency and preserve the conditions that allow international collaboration to continue safely. It is not a coincidence that these policies are being developed in tandem with policies relating to science diplomacy.
Contemporary scholarship in science diplomacy suggests that international research cooperation is increasingly shaped by geopolitical competition, technological rivalry and concerns about security and resilience. The recent Palgrave Handbook of Science Diplomacy argues that science diplomacy is moving beyond a simple “bridge-building” model towards a more complex system of governance involving states, universities, companies and international networks operating under conditions of strategic uncertainty.
Seen through this lens, the growing divergence of research security approaches may be a reflection of a wider transition in how countries seek to balance openness, collaboration and national interests. Traditionally, science diplomacy was seen as something undertaken by diplomats, governments and international organisations. Universities participated in international partnerships – but were rarely expected to think of themselves as diplomatic actors.
Increasingly, however, questions about international partnerships, researcher mobility, technological sovereignty, talent attraction and research security sit at the intersection of higher education and foreign policy.
Universities are not only responding to diplomatic relationships between states. In many cases, they are helping to shape them. Decisions about international partnerships, researcher mobility, technology access and talent attraction have growing diplomatic consequences, whether universities intend them to or not.
The European Commission's emerging science diplomacy framework explicitly links international cooperation with strategic interests and research security. At the same time, university groups such as CESAER argue that institutions themselves play a role in science diplomacy through international collaboration, evidence-informed policymaking and the maintenance of relationships across political divides.
Recent parliamentary scrutiny in the UK points in the same direction. In the science committee’s report Science diplomacy: Sovereignty, strategy and the global race, MPs argued that science diplomacy has become more important as geopolitical fragmentation increases, while also stressing the importance of sovereign capability and resilience in strategically important technologies.
In its response last week, the government agreed that international science and technology engagement should be more strategic and argued that the UK’s approach to technology sovereignty is “about strengthening resilience and reducing over-dependence” and not about “pursuing isolation”.
This exchange illustrates the increasingly difficult task of balancing openness, collaboration, innovation, resilience, security and technological sovereignty. While these objectives are not inherently in conflict, neither are they perfectly aligned, requiring governments, funders and institutions to navigate increasingly complex trade-offs.
Yet alignment among middle powers should not be mistaken for complete agreement. In Australia, recently proposed legislation would give ministers greater powers to intervene in branch campus partnerships and other international arrangements. While very different from developments in the US or China, it is another example of governments becoming more directly involved in decisions that universities may once have viewed primarily through an academic or institutional lens.
Science diplomacy and research security are no longer separate conversations, and research organisations are increasingly being required to engage in both.
Beyond compliance
Some research security frameworks are becoming more interventionist – but science itself remains profoundly international. This means that many of the relationships that generate the greatest scientific value are becoming increasingly politically sensitive.
Universities therefore face a challenge that goes beyond compliance. As Ross McLennan, pro-vice chancellor for research services at Macquarie University, has argued, research security is increasingly becoming a design problem, rather than simply a question of compliance. The challenge is not merely implementing rules, but building the governance, judgement and institutional culture needed to make deliberate decisions about international partnerships, talent, risk and opportunity.
In a more fragmented geopolitical environment, universities are no longer simply participants in science diplomacy. Through the partnerships they build, sustain, and sometimes decline, they are increasingly helping to shape it. Science diplomacy is no longer just the work of diplomats. It is an increasingly important part of the strategic business of universities.
Sapna Marwaha is the founder and CEO of Formation Consultancy.